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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
IMPEACHMENT USE OF POST-
ARREST SILENCE WHICH
PRECEDES THE RECEIPT OF
MIRANDA WARNINGS
Fletcher v. Weir, 102 S. Ct. 1309 (1982) (per curiam).
INTRODUCTION
The law of evidence provides that a witness may be impeached by
his prior assertions if the assertions are inconsistent with his testimony.1
A second evidentiary rule provides that the failure to assert a fact when
it would have been natural to do so may be treated as an assertion that
the fact does not exist.2 Consistent with these two principles, the law of
evidence permits a witness's prior silence to be used for impeachment
purposes if the silence is inconsistent with the statements which the wit-
ness has made at trial.
3
Although the impeachment use of prior silence is recognized under
traditional evidentiary law, the practice must also satisfy applicable con-
stitutional requirements. 4 The Supreme Court has reviewed the im-
I 3AJ. VIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1017-1046 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). Impeachment is the
process whereby the veracity of a witness is called into question through the introduction of
evidence at trial. The most common and effective method of impeachment involves a show-
ing that the witness has previously made assertions that are inconsistent with his present
testimony. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 33, at 66 (1972).
2 4J. WIGMORE,supra note 1, § 1071, at 102. Whether it would have been natural for an
individual to make a particular assertion depends upon the circumstances of the particular
case. C. MCCORMICK, supra note I, § 34, at 68. In general, this determination is to be made
by the trial court. When an evidentiary matter has "grave constitutional overtones," how-
ever, the Supreme Court may exercise its supervisory power over the lower federal courts and
determine whether a prior assertion is sufficiently inconsistent with trial testimony to be ad-
missible for the limited purpose of impeachment. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391,
423-24 (1957). For a more complete discussion of the federal supervisory power, see infra
notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
3 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1042, at 1056.
4 The impeachment use of prior silence must always comply with federal constitutional
law. The practice must also comply with state constitutional law when a case originates in a
state court. See generaly J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTTrrU-
TIONAL LAW ch. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK].
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peachment use of prior silence under the federal constitution in a
number of different situations. In Doyle v. Ohio,5 the Court held that it is
constitutionally impermissible to use a witness's prior silence for im-
peachment purposes if the silence followed the witness's arrest and his
receipt of Miranda6 warnings. 7 The Court has reached a different con-
clusion, however, with respect to pre-arrest silence. In Jenkins V. Ander-
son," *the Court distinguished Doyle and held that there is no
constitutional limitation on the use of a witness's prior silence for im-
peachment purposes if the silence preceded the witness's arrest. 9 Last
term, the Court considered the constitutionality of the impeachment use
of prior silence in a third situation.
In Fletcher v. Weir,' 0 the Court held that the federal constitution
does not prohibit the use of a witness's prior silence for impeachment
purposes if the silence followed the witness's arrest but preceded his re-
ceipt of Miranda warnings."I The per curiam opinion emphasized that
the states are entitled to determine under their own rules of evidence the
extent to which such prior silence may be used to discredit a witness's
testimony.' 2 The Court's refusal to prohibit the impeachment use of all
post-arrest silence as a matter of federal constitutional law is arguably
inconsistent with the reasoning in Doyle andJenkins. Nevertheless, the
Court's decision to defer to state evidentiary law strikes a reasonable
balance between the need for impeachment as a means of ascertaining
the truth at trial and the concern for the protection of individual rights.
5 426 U.S. 610 (1976). For a more complete discussion of this case, see infra notes 45-51
and accompanying text.
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires that the authorities follow certain
procedures before subjecting an individual to custodial interrogation. In particular, the indi-
vidual must be warned that:
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
Although the procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are triggered by interrogation
and custody rather than by interrogation and arrest, this Note will use the terms "arrest" and
"arrestee" to refer to custodial interrogation and to an individual who is being subjected to
custodial interrogation.
7 426 U.S. at 619.
8 447 U.S. 231 (1980). For a more complete discussion of this case, see infra notes 52-61
and accompanying text.
9 Id. at 240.
10 102 S. Ct. 1309 (1982) (per curiam).




II. EVIDENTIARY LAW AND THE IMPEACHMENT USE
OF PRIOR SILENCE
As noted above, the impeachment use of prior silence must comply
with both evidentiary and constitutional law. The first of these stan-
dards, however, is not always available as a basis of review. Because the
state courts are the final interpreters of state law, a federal court's deci-
sion to reverse a state court's ruling on the impeachment use of prior
silence must be based upon a violation of federal constitutional law.
13
Because Fletcher originated as a state proceeding, the Court was limited
to the application of federal constitutional principles. The Court's con-
sideration of these principles will be discussed below. At this point,
however, it will be helpful to examine the traditional standards gov-
erning the admissibility of evidence and their application to the im-
peachment use of a witness's prior silence.
A. THE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE
In addition to satisfying the requirement of inconsistency,' 4 the im-
peachment use of prior silence must meet the traditional standards gov-
erning the admissibility of evidence. At the federal level, the standards
of admisssibility are set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence and ques-
tions of federal evidentiary law are reviewable by the Court through the
application of these rules. 15 At the state level, the admissibility of evi-
dence is generally determined in accordance with a controlling eviden-
tiary code.16 These statutory bases of review are founded on traditional
evidentiary law.
The traditional standards for the admissibility of evidence focus
upon the concept of relevancy. 17 In general, relevancy is the tendency
of evidence to establish the material propostion which the evidence is
13 See generaly J. NOWAK, SUpra note 4, ch. 1.
14 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
15 The Federal Rules of Evidence were approved by Congress on January 2, 1975 and
became effective on July 1, 1975. Preface to FED. R. EVID. These rules govern proceedings in
the courts of the United States and before United States magistrates. FED. R. EvID. 101.
16 State legislatures have the power to prescribe rules of evidence provided that the rules
do not violate constitutional law. See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 9 (1967).
17 See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note I, § § 184-185; J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898). Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
"[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
FED. R. EvlD. 402. The determination of relevancy is to be made by the trial judge on the
basis of his experience and his knowledge of human conduct and motivation. C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 1, § 185, at 438.
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being offered to prove. 18 Evidence is relevant if the existence of the fact
which the evidence is being offered to prove renders the fact in issue
more probable or improbable than it would otherwise be. 19 Evidence
which does not meet this standard is inadmissible at trial.
20
Relevant evidence is said to have probative value and is admissible
unless its admission is specifically prohibited.2' It may be excluded pur-
suant to a particular statute or constitutional consideration. 22 In addi-
tion, a court may exclude relevant evidence under traditional
evidentiary law if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by
the risks which would accompany its admission.23 The most important
contervailing considerations include the danger of undue prejudice, the
risk of distracting the jury, the likelihood of consuming an unreasonable
amount of time, and the possibility of unfair surprise.
24
B. THE FEDERAL SUPERVISORY POWER
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Supreme Court was able to review questions of federal evidentiary law
under the federal supervisory power. The federal supervisory power au-
thorizes the Court to correct lower federal court procedures that it
18 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 185, at 435. Related to the concept of relevancy is the
concept of materiality. If the proposition which the evidence is being offered to prove is
neither a matter in issue nor probative of a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. If the
proposition which the evidence is being offered to prove is immaterial, the evidence is not
relevant. Id.
19 Id., § 185, at 438. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "'[r]elevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
20 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 9 at 289. Wigmore expresses this principle as follows:
"None but facts having rational probative value are admissible." Id.
21 Id., § 10, at 293. Wigmore expresses this principle as follows: "All facts having rational
probative value are admissible unless some specific rule forbids." Id.
22 See generally FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee note. Examples of statutes which
restrict the admissibility of relevant evidence include 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1976) (railroad reor-
ganization petitions inadmissible if dismissed) and 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976) (interception and
divulgence of wire or radio communications prohibited unless authorized by sender). For
examples of constitutional considerations which restrict the admissibility of relevant evidence,
see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (evidence obtained by unlawful search and
seizure inadmissible) and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (incriminating state-
ment elicited from an accused in violation of right to counsel inadmissible).
23 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 185, at 438-4 1.
24 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, con fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. The rule
does not list the risk of unfair surprise as a ground for the exclusion of relevant evidence. The
advisory committee note reasons that the granting of a continuance is more appropriate than
the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for unfair surprise. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory com-
mittee note.
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deems unfair even though constitutional principles have not been vio-
lated.25 The power is generally regarded as having had its origin in
McNabb v. United Stales.26 In McNabb, the Court reversed a murder con-
viction on the basis of its "supervisory authority over the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts."127 In the forty years since that
decision, the Court has exercised its supervisory power in both civil and
criminal cases and has brought about significant reforms in federal
lower court procedure.
28
The federal supervisory power enables the Court to raise the stan-
dards of fairness in the administration of the federal justice system while
avoiding the rigidity of constitutional decisions.29 The power is not
available, however, when state court procedures are the subject ofjudi-
cal review.30 When reviewing a state court's impeachment use of prior
silence, the Court must affirm the practice in the particular case or pro-
hibit it in all cases as a matter of federal constitutional law. As will be
discussed below, the Court was faced with this choice in Fletcher v. Weir.
C. UNITED STATES V. HALE
In United States v. Hale ,31 the Court exercised its supervisory power
and reversed, on the basis of federal evidentiary law, a federal court's
decision to permit the impeachment use of prior silence.32 William Hale
was arrested after he was identified as the perpetrator of an assault and
robbery. He was taken to the police station and advised of his right to
remain silent under Miranda. At the station, the authorities searched
Hale and discovered that he was carrying a substantial sum of money.
25 The Supreme Court possesses an historical power of supervision over the lower federal
courts. See generaly Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervroqy Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 181
(1969); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisog Power ofthe Federal Courts, 53 GEo. L. J. 1050 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as The Judge-Made Supervisogy Power]; Note, The Supervisogy Power ofthe Federal
Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963) [hereinafter cited as The Superviso,7 Power].
26 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
27 Id. at 340.
28 Federal lower court procedures may be corrected either through a decision limited to
the circumstances of the particular case or through the formulation of rules of general appli-
cation. The Supervisory Power, supra note 25, at 1659. Moreover, the federal supervisory power
authorizes the Court to correct federal lower court procedures regardless of the effect of the
procedures on the particular litigants. The Judge-Made Supervisor7 Power, supra note 25, at 1077.
This authority enables the Court to "shift its focus from the adjudication of the parties' rights
to a more general investigation ofjudicial procedures." The Supervisory Power, supra note 25, at
1657.
29 Hill, supra note 25, at 193.
30 TheJudge-Made Supervisor Power, supra note 25, at 1050 n.2. The courts of general juris-
diction at the state level possess a supervisory power over the lower state courts. Id.
31 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
32 Id. at 180.
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Hale did not respond when questioned as to the source of the money.33
At his trial in federal district court, Hale testified in his own defense
and offered both an alibi for the robbery and an explanation for his
possession of the money. The prosecution attempted to discredit this
testimony by forcing Hale to admit on cross-examination that he had
not provided any exculpatory information when he was questioned
shortly after his arrest. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard
this portion of the examination but refused to declare a mistrial. Hale
was convicted of robbery.3 4 The court of appeals reversed the convic-
tion 35 and the Supreme Court affirmed.
36
The Court suggested that in most circumstances "silence is so am-
biguous that it is of little probative force." T37 The majority reasoned that
silence is particularly ambiguous in the post-arrest context because an
arrestee is under no duty to speak and has ordinarily been advised by
government authorities that he has the right to remain silent.38 More-
over, the majority asserted that ajury is likely to assign more weight to a
defendant's post-arrest silence than is warranted. 39 Exercising its super-
visory power over the lower federal courts, the Court held that the pro-
bative value of Hale's post-arrest silence was insignificant and was
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice which would accompany
its admission.40
33 Id. at 174.
34 Id.
35 498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court of appeals held that Hale's post-arrest si-
lence was not inconsistent with his testimony at trial and that its use for impeachment pur-
poses was an impermissible infringement upon his fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 1043. The majority asserted that it would be "grossly
unfair" to permit the impeachment use of an individual's post-arrest silence after the individ-
ual had been informed that he had the right to remain silent. Id. at 1044.
36 422 U.S. at 181.
37 Id. at 176. The Court based its decision primarily on the possibility that the defendant
had relied upon his right to remain silent. Nevertheless, the Court argued that a number of
other factors can cause an individual to remain silent following arrest. The majority sug-
gested that an arrestee may not have heard or fully understood the question, may have felt
that there was no need to reply, may have maintained silence because of an unwillingness to
incriminate another, or may have been reacting to the inherent pressures of custodial interro-
gation. Id. at 177.
38 Id. at 176.
39 Id. at 180. The Court argued that the defendant's opportunity to explain his prior
silence is unlikely to overcome "the strong negative inference that the jury is likely to draw"
from the defendant's failure to speak. Id.
40 Id. Because the Court based its decision on federal evidentiary law, it did not reach the
broader constitutional question which had served as the basis for the court of appeals' deci-
sion. See supra note 35.
The government's argument in Hale relied heavily on the Court's decision in Raffel v.
United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926). In Rafel, the defendant chose not to testify at his trial for
conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act. The jury failed to reach a verdict and a
second trial was required. At the second trial, the defendant took the stand to refute the
1982] 1577
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE IMPEACHMENT
USE OF PRIOR SILENCE
Theoretically, the impeachment use of prior silence may be chal-
lenged as violative of either the fifth amendment privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination or the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.41 The fifth amendment guarantees criminal defendants
the right to remain silent at trial and prohibits the prosecution from
commenting on a decision to exercise that right.42 In Miranda, the Court
extended the fifth amendment right to remain silent to include pre-trial
situations in which an individual is subjected to custodial interroga-
tion.43 Because the impeachment use of prior silence burdens the exer-
cise of the fifth amendment right to remain silent by allowing comment
on prior silence at trial, one can argue that the practice violates the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees all defendants the right to due process of law.44 Be-
cause there are many possible explanations for an individual's failure to
speak, one can argue that prior silence is unlikely to be probative of the
falsity of a defendant's testimony and that the impeachment use of prior
silence therefore violates the due process clause. These arguments have
been examined by the Court in the context of both post-arrest and pre-
arrest silence.
A. DOYLE V OHIO
In Doyle v. Ohio,45 the Court prohibited, on the basis of federal con-
stitutional law, the impeachment use of post-arrest silence which follows
the receipt of Miranda warnings. Jefferson Doyle was arrested and
charged with selling marijuana to a local narcotics bureau informant.
At the time of the arrest and pursuant to a valid warrant, the police
searched Doyle's car and recovered the money that had allegedly been
testimony of a government witness who had offered the same evidence in the first proceeding.
Over the objections of defense counsel, the trial court allowed the prosecution to cross-ex-
amine the defendant on his silence at the first trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the
silence was inconsistent with the defendant's testimony at the second proceeding and that the
prosecution's use of the silence for impeachment purposes did not violate the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 499. In Hale, the Court
distinguished Rajl by concluding that the defendant's prior silence was not inconsistent with
his testimony. 422 U.S. at 171.
41 Se The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 77, 85 (1980).
42 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). The fifth amendment provides that
"[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43 See infra note 97.
44 The fourteenth amendment provides that "[no state shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
45 426 U.S. 610.
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used to purchase the marijuana. The authorities informed Doyle of his
Miranda rights. Although Doyle asked the police why they were arrest-
ing him, he did not offer an explanation for his possession of the
money.
46
At his trial in state court, Doyle testified that he had met with the
informant to buy rather than to sell narcotics and that the informant
had given him the money in order to frame him. The prosecution at-
tempted to impeach Doyle's credibility by asking the defendant why he
had not provided this explanation at the time of his arrest. Over the
objections of defense counsel, the trial court ruled that this line of cross-
examination was proper. Doyle was convicted of selling narcotics and
this ruling was upheld by the state appellate court.
47
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the ruling of
the state courts.48 The Court held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment prohibits the impeachment use of an individ-
ual's post-arrest silence if the individual had previously been informed
of his right to remain silent.49 The Court advanced two grounds for its
decision. First, it contended that post-arrest silence is "insolubly ambig-
uous" when an arrestee has received Miranda warnings because the ar-
restee may simply be exercising his right to remain silent. 50 Second, it
asserted that it would be "fundamentally unfair" to permit post-arrest
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at
trial because the Miranda warnings contain an implied assurance that
silence will carry no penalty.
5 '
46 Id. at 611.
47 Id. at 615.
48 Id. at 619.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 617. In a footnote, the Court cited its decision in Hale for the proposition that
post-arrest silence may be inherently ambiguous apart from the impact of Miranda warnings.
Id. at 618 n.8. The majority noted, however, that Doyle originated in a state court and there-
fore provided no occasion for the exercise of the Court's supervisory power over the lower
federal courts. Id. Although the majority asserted that post-arrest silence is "insolubly ambig-
uous," it contended that it was expressing no opinion as to the probative value of Doyle's
post-arrest silence. Id. The Court was apparently acknowledging that it was not authorized
to review the state court's application of state evidentiary law. See supra note 13 and accom-
panying text.
51 426 U.S. at 618. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that there is nothing
deceptive in the Miranda warnings and that the use of post-arrest silence for impeachment
purposes does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 626
(Stevens, J.,.dissenting). In addition, he asserted that the receipt of Afiranda warnings does
not lessen the probative value of post-arrest silence. Id. at 621 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Stevens concluded that Doyle's silence was inconsistent with his subsequent exculpatory
statements at trial and was therefore admissible for impeachment purposes. Id. at 626 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens also examined a passage from Miranda which the majority did not discuss.
In Miranda, the Court noted that "it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising
1982] 1579
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B. JENKINS V ANDERSON
InJenkins v. Anderson, 52 the Court considered for the first time the
use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes. Den-
nis Jenkins stabbed and killed a man after an argument and brief strug-
gle. Although Jenkins informed his probation officer of the stabbing
three days later, he was not arrested until he ttirned himself over to the
police nearly two weeks after the incident.
53
At his trial in state court, Jenkins testified that he had acted in self-
defense. The prosectuion attempted to discredit this testimony by em-
phasizing during cross-examination that Jenkins had waited nearly two
weeks before reporting the stabbing to the authorities. In its closing ar-
gument to the jury, the prosecution once again referred to the defend-
ant's pre-arrest silence. Jenkins was convicted of manslaughter and this
ruling was upheld by the state appellate court.54 Following his convic-
tion, Jenkins petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the
impeachment use of his pre-arrest silence violated both his fifth amend-
ment privilege against compelled self-incrimination and his right to due
process under the fourteenth amendment.5 5 The district court and the
court of appeals refused to grant the writ, and the Supreme Court af-
firmed the denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief.
5 6
In support of its decision, the Court cited Rafel v. United States57 for
[his right to remain silent] when he is under custodial interrogation. The prosecution may
not, therefore, use at trial the fact that [the individual] stood mute or claimed his privilege in
the face of accusation." 384 U.S. at 468 n.37. Justice Stevens concluded that this passage did
not apply. 426 U.S. at 628 (Stevens, J., dissenting). First, he noted that Doyle neither stood
mute nor claimed the privilege. Id. at 627 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, he cited the
distinction between the affirmative use of an individual's prior silence and the use of that
silence for the limited purpose of impeachment and concluded that Miranda was not directed
at the latter. Id. at 628 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the Court in Doyle based its decision
on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, it did not reach this or any other fifth
amendment issue.
52 447 U.S. 231.
53 Id. at 232.
54 Id. at 234.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 271 U.S. 494. In Ra,l, the Court held that the fifth amendment does not prohibit the
impeachment use of a defendant's failure to testify at a previous trial. See supra note 40. In
Jenkins, the majority noted that a defendant's silence at a previous trial is more clearly pro-
tected by the fifth amendment than is a defendant's pre-arrest silence, and concluded that the
Court's decision in Rafil therefore established that the impeachment use of pre-arrest silence
does not violate the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
In his concurring opinion injenkins, Justice Stevens asserted that the Court's reliance on
Rail incorrectly implied that a defendant's decision not to testify at his own trial is constitu-
tionally indistinguishable from his silence in a pre-custody context. 447 U.S. at 241 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Given that a citizen is under no official compulsion to speak or to remain
silent, Justice Stevens reasoned that a voluntary decision to do one or the other does not raise
an issue under the fifth amendment. Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his dissenting
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the proposition that "the [fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination] is not violated when a defendant who testifies in his
own defense is impeached with his prior silence."'58 The majority ac-
knowledged that the possibility of impeachment by prior silence might
discourage the exercise of fifth amendment rights, but argued that this
burden was permissible given the importance of impeachment to the
ascertainment of the truth.59 The Court rejected the defendant's four-
teenth amendment claim by noting that "no governmental action in-
duced [Jenkins] to remain silent."6 The Court concluded that the
fundamental unfairness present in Doyle was absent in Jenkins because
Jenkins's silence did not follow the receipt of Mirana warnings.
61
IV. FLETCHER v WEiR
Eric Weir stabbed Ronnie Buchanan during a fight in a night club
parking lot in Kentucky. Weir immediately left the scene and did not
report the incident to the police. Buchanan died as a result of the stab-
bing and Weir was ultimately arrested and charged with intentional
murder. The authorities apparently did not inform Weir of his Miranda
rights.
62
At his trial in Kentucky state court, Weir testified in his own de-
fense and admitted on direct examination that he had stabbed
Buchanan. He asserted, however, that he had acted in self-defense and
that the stabbing had been accidental. This was the first occasion on
opinion, Justice Marshall confessed that he found this view of the fifth amendment "incom-
prehensible." Id. at 250 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that the viola-
tion of the fifth amendment occurred not when the defendant remained silent, but when that
silence was later used to impeach his credibility at trial. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a
more complete discussion of the applicability of the fifth amendment to the impeachment use
of pre-arrest silence, see infa note 86.
58 447 U.S. at 235.
59 Id. at 238. For a more complete discussion of the importance of impeachment to the
ascertainment of the truth at trial, see infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
60 447 U.S. at 240.
61 Id. BecauseJenkins originated in a state court, the Court was unable to exercise its
supervisory power over the lower federal courts and did not consider the probative value of
Jenkins' pre-arrest silence. The Court noted, however, that "[elach jurisdiction remains free
to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more pro-
bative than prejudicial." Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall presented three arguments in support of rever-
sal. First, he contended that pre-arrest silence is of so little probative value that to permit its
use for impeachment purposes is contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Second, he argued that the fifth amendment right to remain silent applied to Jenkins
before the defendant's arrest and therefore precluded the use of Jenkins's silence at trial.
Third, he asserted that permitting the impeachment use of pre-arrest silence impermissibly
burdens the exercise of the constitutional right to testify in one's own defense. Id. at 246
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall in dissent.
62 See injra note 69.
COMMENTS
which Weir had advanced an exculpatory version of the stabbing. On
cross-examination, the prosecution emphasized that Weir had failed to
report the incident to the police and had at not time offered an explana-
tion for his actions. Weir was found guilty of first degree manslaughter
and his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
6 3
Following his conviction, Weir petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, contending that the impeachment use of his prior silence vio-
lated his constitutional rights. The district court granted the writ and
the Commonwealth of Kentucky appealed from this judgment.
64
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of Weir's petition for habeas corpus
relief.6 5 The court held that the use of Weir's pre-arrest silence for im-
peachment purposes was constitutional under Jenkins, but that it was
inherently unfair under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to permit cross-examination on the defendant's silence following
arrest. 66 -Although the majority found a "superficial logic" to the posi-
tion that the impeachment use of post-arrest silence is only unfair when
the authorities actually inform an arrestee of his right to remain silent, it
rejected this limitation for two reasons. First, the court contended that
post-arrest silence is not probative of the falsity of a defendant's testi-
mony.6 7 Second, the court asserted that many if not most arrestees
know that they have the right to remain silent and exercise that right.68
The court concluded that arrest itself is governmental action which im-
plicity induces silence, and that it is therefore "fundamentally unfair" to
use post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes at. trial.
69
63 102 S. Ct. at 1310.
64 Id.
65 658 F.2d 1126, 1133 (6th Cir. 1981).
66 Id. at 1131. The court of appeals did not articulate the constitutional basis for its deci-
sion. Although the majority noted that the district court had relied on the fifth amendment
in granting Weir's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and had announced that it was af-
firming the decision to grant habeas corpus relief, the court of appeals relied on the reasoning
in Doyle to reach its conclusion and apparently based its decision orl the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court did not consider whether the impeachment
use of Weir's post-arrest silence was prohibited by the fifth amendment privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination.
67 Id. at 1130. The court quoted extensively from the majority opinion in Hale to support
this contention. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
68 658 F.2d at 1131. The court asserted that the news media has widely publicized both
the Aftranda decision and the formal warnings which the authorities must administer before
subjecting an individual to custodial interrogation. Id.
69 Id. The Commonwealth of Kentucky argued on appeal that the case should be re-
manded for an evidentiary hearing to determine if and when the authorities informed Weir of
his Miranda rights. Because the court of appeals concluded that the defendant's constitutional
rights were violated regardless of whether he had received Miranda warnings, it decided that a
remand was unnecessary. Id. at 1129 n.8.
The court also suggested that two practical problems would arise if the constitutional
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The Supreme Court summarily reversed the decision of the court of
appeals in a brief per curiam opinion which Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall did not join.70 The Court contended that the approach taken by
the court of appeals was unsupported by the reasoning in Doyle and in-
consistent with the subsequent interpretations of that case. 71 The opin-
ion asserted that the decisions of the Court had consistently explained
Doyle as a case in which the government had induced silence by implic-
itly assuring the defendani that his silence would not be used against
him.7 2 Because the record did not indicate that Weir had received Mi-
randa warnings, the opinion argued that the government had not in-
duced the defendant to remain silent. 73 The Court concluded that the
impeachment use of Weir's post-arrest silence did not violate the defend-
ant's right to due process under the fourteenth amendment.
74
Although the Court declined to prohibit the impeachment use of
all post-arrest silence as a matter of federal constitutional law, it empha-
sized that the state courts are entitled to determine under their own
rules of evidence the extent to which prior silence may be used for im-
peachment purposes at trial. 75 The opinion cited the decision in Hale as
an example of this approach and noted that the principles which have
developed as a result of federal decisional law are not necessarily based
on the federal constitution. 76 The Court stressed that the state courts
are free to disregard non-constitutional principles provided that state
procedure remains consistent with due process of law.
77
protection provided in Doyle were conditioned upon an individual's receipt of Miranda warn-
ings. See infla notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
70 102 S. Ct. 1309. Justice Brennan would have set the case for oral argument. Id. at 1312
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall dissented from the summary reversal of the case.
Md. at 1312 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1311.
72 Id. The Court cited Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980), Anderson v.
Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980), andJenkins in support of this assertion. In Roberta, the Court
distinguished post-conviction silence from post-arrest silence and emphasized that the latter
"may be induced by the assurance contained in Miranda warnings." 445 U.S. at 561. In
Anderson, the Court held that Do e "bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence
maintained after receipt of governmental assurances." 447 U.S. at 408. Injenkins, the Court
noted that the impeachment use of post-arrest silence in Doyle was fundamentally unfair be-
cause the silence occurred after Doyle had been taken into custody and informed of his right
to remain silent. 447 U.S. at 239.
73 102 S. Ct. at 1312.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1311.
77 Id. The individual states decide whether to follow or disregard federal decisional law.
See generaloy J. NOWAK, supra note 4, at ch. 1. In the context of evidentiary law, a state that
has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence might be inclined to apply federal evidentiary
principles. The state courts are also free to grant individuals more rights than those guaran-
teed by the federal constitution if this is done on the basis of state law. Id. See general y
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
IN FLETCHER v WEiR
The impeachment use of prior silence raises important evidentiary
and constitutional questions which warrant thoughtful examination.78
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court opinion in Fletcher v. Weir offers little
more than an unpersuasive recitation of legal precedent. The opinion
does not address the arguments supporting a constitutional prohibition
of the impeachment use of all post-arrest silence and does not discuss the
practical implications of conditioning the prohibition upon the prior re-
ceipt of Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, the Court's decision to defer to
state evidentiary law rather than to announce a per se rule under the
federal constitution is neither surprising nor inexpedient.
A. THE REASONING OF THE COURT
In Doyle, the Court relied on the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to prohibit the impeachment use of post-arrest si-
lence which follows the receipt of Miranda warnings. 79 Recently, the
Court has retreated from the approach taken in Doyle and has demon-
strated an unwillingness to prohibit the use of prior silence for impeach-
ment purposes as a matter of federal constitutional law.80 The Court's
decision in Fletcher is consistent with this trend.
As noted above, the Court advanced two grounds for its decision in
Doyle.8 1 First, it reasoned that post-arrest silence is "insolubly ambigu-
ous" when an arrestee has received Miranda warnings because the arres-
tee may simply be exercising his right to remain silent.8 2 Second, it
asserted that it would be "fundamentally unfair" to permit post-arrest
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at
trial because the Miranda warnings contain an implied assurance that
silence will carry no penalty. 3 Each of these arguments apparently con-
tributed to the Court's conclusion that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment prohibits the impeachment use of post-arrest si-
lence. Because the majority found a violation of due process, it did not
reach the defendant's fifth amendment claim.8 4 In Jenkins, the Court
upheld the impeachment use of prior silence under the fifth amendment
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873
(1976).
78 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
80 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
82 426 U.S. at 617.
83 Id. at 618.
84 See supra note 51.
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and weakened Doyle by implicitly rejecting the first of the decision's two
fourteenth amendment rationales.
8 5
Because Jenkins was the first case in which the Court considered
whether the fifth amendment prohibits the impeachment use of pre-ar-
rest silence, the Court's decision to deny the defendant's fifth amend-
ment claim did not retreat from precedent. Nevertheless, the Court
seemed determined to go beyond the facts of the case and suggest that
the impeachment use of prior silence is never prohibited by the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. First, the majority considered and
rejected the fifth amendment argument rather than simply holding that
the fifth amendment does not apply in the pre-arrest context. 86 The
latter approach would have left open the question whether the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination prohibits the impeachment use of
post-arrest silence. Second, the majority relied on Ra il, a case of ques-
tionable vitality, to support its interpretation of the fifth amendment.
8 7
The Court's "resurrection" of Rafl enabled it broadly to assert that
"[the privilege against compelled self-incrimination] is not violated
when a defendant who testifies in his own defense is impeached with his
prior silence."'88 AlthoughJenkins involved only the impeachment use of
pre-arrest silence, the Court's analysis of the fifth amendment permits
the impeachment use of post-arrest silence as well.
The Court's decision in Jenkins also limited the protection afforded
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Jenkins, the
Court permitted the impeachment use of prior silence that was arguably
less probative than the silence involved in Doyle. Jenkins had not been
accused of a crime at the time of his silence and it is unlikely that his
knowledge of the doctrine of self-defense was sufficient to overcome his
85 See The Supreme Court, 1979 Tem, supra note 41, at 84.
86 The fifth amendment does not guarantee an unconditional right to remain silent. It
provides only that the criminal defendant may not be compelled to testify. See supra note 42
and accompanying text. In Miranda, the Court extended the fifth amendment right to remain
silent to include pre-trial situations in which an individual is subjected to custodial interroga-
tion. See infta note 97. Prior to custodial interrogation, however, an individual does not have
a constitutional right to remain silent and is not in a position to have his testimony "com-
pelled." The subsequent impeachment use of his failure to speak therefore does not involve
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. InJenkirts, the Court could have employed
this analysis and held that the fifth amendment does not apply in the pre-arrest context.
87 In Grunewald, the Court held that the fifth amendment prohibits the impeachment use
of a defendant's decision not to testify before a grand jury. Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391, 415 (1957). In a concurring opinion, four justices reasoned that the use of a consti-
tutional privilege to discredit or convict an individual who asserts it is never justified and
argued that Ral should be explicitly overruled. Id. at 426. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 241 n.2
(Stevens, J., concurring).
88 447 U.S. at 235. The reference to the "resurrection" of Rafel is taken from the dissent-
ing opinion injenkins. See id. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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natural reluctance to volunteer to the police that he had killed a man.89
Moreover, Jenkins was a black man on parole in a racially divided city
and had twice been convicted of felonies. 90 These considerations suggest
that his decision to remain silent was motivated by fear rather than
guilt. 9' Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the impeachment use of
Jenkins's pre-arrest silence was not prohibited by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Because of the limited probative value of
Jenkins's prior silence, this conclusion suggests that virtually any silence
is sufficiently probative to satisfy due process of law.
92
The Court's decision in Jenkins established that the fifth amend-
ment privilege against compelled self-incrimination does not prohibit
the use of prior silence for impeachment purposes. 93 In addition,Jenkins
suggests that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment only
prohibits the impeachment use of prior silence if governmental action
has induced the silence.94 The Court relied on these holdings in Fletcher
and concluded that the impeachment use of the defendant's post-arrest
silence was constitutional because the defendant had not received an
"affirmative assurance" that he would not be penalized if he exercised
his right to remain silent.95 The opinion implied that the government
can only induce silence through the reading of Miranda warnings.
The Court's analysis in Fletcher is arguably unsound. In particular,
it seems that the reading of Miranda warnings is not the only governmen-
tal action that can induce silence. An individual who is aware of his
right to remain silent may be induced to exercise that right by the act of
arrest. 96 Because the federal constitution has implicity assured the indi-
vidual who is aware of his right to remain silent that post-arrest silence
will carry no penalty, the impeachment use of his silence would appear
to be "fundamentally unfair" and constitutionally impermissible.
97
89 The evidence suggests that Jenkins had no knowledge of the doctrine of self-defense.
When asked to explain why he had not turned himself over to the authorities if he was inno-
cent, Jenkins testified that he did not know anything about the law. Appendix at 38, Jenkins
v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
90 Id. at 48.
91 See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 248 (Marshall. J., dissenting).
92 See The Supreme Court, 1-979 Term, supra note 41, at 85.
93 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 60-61 and acompanying text.
95 102 S. Ct. at 1312.
96 This was one of two arguments advanced by the court of appeals in Fletcher in support
of its position that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the im-
peachment use of all post-arrest silence. See 658 F.2d at 1131.
97 The furnishing of Miranda warnings does not create the right to remain silent. The
warnings are necessary as "prophylactic safeguards" to counteract the potential for compul-
sion inherent in custodial interrogation and thereby protect an arrestee's fifth amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is therefore derived
from the federal constitution. SeeJenkins, 447 U.S. at 247 n.1. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, considerable support exists for the position that knowledge of
the post-arrest right to remain silent is widespread.98 This consideration
increases the likelihood that an individual has been induced to remain
silent by the act of arrest and suggests that the impeachment use of post-
arrest silence violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment regardless of whether the individual had received Miranda
warnings.99
Although the act of arrest might induce an individual to remain
silent, the mere possibility of such inducement does not necessarily jus-
tify the extension of protection under the federal constitution. The con-
cern for the protection of individual rights must be balanced against the
need for impeachment as a means of ascertaining the truth at trial. The
impeachment process plays a critical role in the adversary system.100 It
forces a witness to explain his prior inconsistent assertions and discour-
ages the presentation of fabricated defenses.' 0' Because the impeach-
ment use of prior silence enhances the reliability of the criminal process,
98 See Schiller, On the Jurisprudence of the Fih Amendment Right to Silence, 16 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 197, 224 (1979); Note, Evidence - Exclusion and Suppression - Silence of Defendant When
ArrestedMay Mot Be Used to Impeach His Testimony, 87 HARV. L. REv. 882, 885 (1974). Both of
these articles suggest that the public awareness of the post-arrest right to remain silent is
extensive. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
99 The federal appellate courts have consistently taken this position. Although the second
circuit has noted that the Court's decision inJenkins might require a re-examination of the
significance of an individual's having been informed of his right to remain silent, see United
States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981), the other circuits have not suggested that the
constitutional protection provided in Doyle should be conditioned upon an individual's re-
ceipt of firanda warnings. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1981); Alo
v. Olim, 639 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.
1980); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1980).
A number of cases decided before the Court's decision inJenkins have reached the same
conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Nunez-Rioz, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980); Bradford v.
Stone, 594 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979); United States ex rel. Allen v. Rowe, 591 F.2d 391 (7th
Cir. 1979), vacated and remandedfor reconsideration in light ofJenkins, 447 U.S. 917 (1980); Douglas
v. Cupp, 578 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979).
In his dissenting opinion in Jenkins, Justice Marshall reasoned that the impeachment use
of post-arrest silence should be constitutionally prohibited regardless of whether an individual
has received Miranda warnings. 447 U.S. at 247 n. 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Mar-
shall argued that post-arrest silence is "insolubly ambiguous." Id.
100 See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238.
to The need to develop all relevant facts at trial is both "fundamental and comprehen-
sive." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). In Doyle, the Court recognized that
"unless prosecutors are allowed wide leeway in the scope of impeachment cross-examination
some defendants would be able to frustrate the truth-seeking function of a trial by presenting
tailored defenses insulated from effective challenge." 426 U.S. at 617 n.7. The importance of
impeachment was also emphasized in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Hams, the
Court held that although statements taken in violation of Miranda could not be used by the
prosecution as part of its case in chief, they were admissible for the limited purpose of im-
peachment. Id. at 225.
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it should only be restricted when the possibility of violating individual
rights is substantial.
The reading of Miranda warnings constitutes the most direct and
convincing assurance to an arrestee that he will not be penalized if he
remains silent.102 It establishes that the arrestee is aware of his right to
remain silent and increases the probability that he has been induced to
exercise that right. When an individual has not been informed of his
right to remain silent, a failure to speak is less likely to have constitu-
tional significance. Moreover, an arrestee who has not received Miranda
warnings will probably inform the authorities of a decision to invoke his
right to remain silent and thereby both limit the interrogation and ex-
plain his failure to speak. In the absence of an express invocation of the
right to remain silent, the receipt of Miranda warnings constitutes the
point at which the probative value of prior silence is outweighed by the
possibility that governmental action has induced an arrestee to remain
silent. 103
The balancing test outlined above supports a refusal constitution-
ally to prohibit the impeachment use of all post-arrest silence. As indi-
cated, however, an express invocation of the right to remain silent
should require constitutional protection regardless of whether an indi-
vidual has received Miranda warnings. An express invocation of the
right to remain silent establishes that an individual is aware of his right
to remain silent and increases the likelihood that he is relying on the
constitutional assurance that silence will carry no penalty. 0 4 The
Court's reasoning in Doyle suggests that to permit the impeachment use
102 The effectiveness of the Miranda warnings is thought to follow not only from the impor-
tant rights which are provided, but also from the fact that the warnings are being adminis-
tered to the arrestee by his interrogators. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. The second of these
conditions is essential because it increases an arrestee's confidence in his ability to limit police
conduct. See id.
103 The dissenting opinion in the court of appeals advanced a similar argument. 658 F.2d
at 1136 (Engel, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that prior silence often is of significant
probative value and that due process was only implicated in Doyle because the probative
value of the defendant's post-arrest silence was outweighed by the need to protect the integ-
rity of the implied promise made by the authorities through their reading of the Miranda
warnings. Id. The dissent concluded that, in the absence of express warnings, the need for
full factual disclosure in order to ascertain the truth outweighed the constitutional concern
for procedural due process. Id. at 1137 (Engel, J., dissenting).
The dissent also suggested that the Court's decision in Doyle was motivated in part by a
concern that the authorities would deliberately use Miranda warnings to induce an arrestee to
remain silent and thereby obtain impeachment evidence. Id. at 1134 (Engel, J., dissenting).
Although this concern would explain the Court's emphasis on an individual's receipt of Mi-
randa warnings rather than his knowledge of the right to remain silent, no support exists for
the dissent's contention in the language of the opinion. Moreover, the clear purpose of custo-
dial interrogation is to elicit information rather than to obtain impeachment evidence for a
possible trial. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
104 An express invocation of the right to remain silent will often render an arrestee's silence
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of post-arrest silence under these circumstances would violate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court's opinion in
Fletcher does not recognize this exception and instead focuses exclusively
upon whether an arrestee had received Miranda warnings at the time of
his prior silence. Although this approach is inconsistent with the Court's
earlier reasoning, it reflects the Court's apparent intention to limit the
impact of its decision in Doyle. 05
B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The court of appeals in Fletcher suggested that two practical
problems would arise if the constitutional protection provided in Doyle
were conditioned upon an individual's receipt of Miranda warnings.
First, the majority contended that the knowledgeable defendant would
be penalized because he is more likely to exercise his right to remain
silent despite the failure of the authorities to inform him of that right.'
06
Second, the majority asserted that the police would be encouraged to
postpone the reading of Miranda warnings if they could use any post-
arrest silence for impeachment purposes at trial. 0 7 Neither of these con-
cerns justifies an unqualified prohibition of the impeachment use of
post-arrest silence. t0 8
natural and therefore inadmissible under traditional evidentiary law. See supra notes 1-3 and
accompanying text.
105 In addition to the limitations imposed injenkins, see supra notes 85-94 and accompany-
ing text, the Court has evidenced an unwillingness to remedy violations of its holding in
Doyle. See, e.g., Briggs v. Connecticut, 447 U.S. 912 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Blakley v. Florida, 444 U.S. 904, 904-05 (1979) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). In each of these cases, the state courts permitted the impeachment
use of post-arrest silence despite the defendant's receipt of Miranda warnings. The Court has
also weakened Doyle by limiting the definition of "silence." In Anderson, the Court examined
the combination of post-arrest statements and post-arrest silence and held that a defendant
who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain si-
lent. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408. This conclusion ignores the ability of an arrestee to invoke his
right to remain silent at any time during custodial interrogation.
The Court's apparent retreat from the principles announced in Doyle was perhaps inevi-
table. In Dorle, the Court relied on Miranda to increase the protection of individual rights at a
time when the Court was consistently attempting to limit the impact of Miranda and avoid
the establishment of per se exclusionary rules. See generall Grossman & Lane, Miranda: The
Erosion ofa Doctrine, 62 CHI. B. REc. 250 (198 1); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99.
106 658 F.2d at 1132.
107 Id.
108 A third consideration involves the jury's ability to distinguish between the impeach-
ment use and the substantive use of prior silence. Although prior inconsistent assertions may
be introduced to discredit a witness's testimony, they are generally inadmissible as substantive
evidence under the rule against hearsay. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1018, at 995. The
jury can therefore consider prior inconsistent assertions for the purpose of judging a witness's
veracity but must not treat the evidence as direct proof of the offense with which the defend-
ant has been charged. Empirical studies suggest that juries are unable to make this distinc-
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The first argument begs the question by assuming a right to consti-
tutional protection. The knowledgeable defendant is by definition more
likely to exercise his right to remain silent despite the failure of the au-
thorities to inform him of that right. He is therefore more likely to have
the impeachment use of his post-arrest silence examined under state evi-
dentiary law rather than prohibited under the federal constitution. It
does not necessarily follow, however, that the knowledgeable defendant
is being penalized by the Court's decision in Fletcher. The case merely
limits the protection afforded under the federal constitution because the
protection is not justified. Unless an arrestee has received Miranda warn-
ings or has expressly invoked his right to remain silent, the probative
value of prior silence outweighs the danger that governmental action
has induced the arrestee's failure to speak.'0 9
The second argument ignores the purpose of custodial interroga-
tion. Because the procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are trig-
gered by the combination of custody and interrogation,'" 0  the
authorities could conceivably arrest an individual but not subject him to
interrogation and thereby preserve the opportunity to use any post-ar-
rest silence for impeachment purposes at trial. It is unlikely, however,
that the Court's decision in Fletcher will encourage the police to deliber-
ately postpone the reading of Miranda warnings. The purpose of custo-
dial interrogation is to elicit information. From the perspective of the
police and the prosecution, the risk that police conduct will be inter-
preted by a court as interrogation and that valuable statements will
therefore be excluded greatly outweighs the possibility that an arrestee
will remain silent and that this silence will be admissible for impeach-
ment purposes at trial."'
tion when prior inconsistent silence is involved. See Schiller, supra note 98, at 225. As a result,
it has been argued that the impeachment use of prior silence unduly prejudices the defendant
and should therefore be prohibited. Id.
Even if one assumes that juries are unable to distinguish between the impeachment use
and the substantive use of prior silence, it does not necessarily follow that the impeachment
use of prior silence unduly prejudices the defendant. The substantive use of prior inconsistent
assertions is arguably desirable. As originally drafted, the Federal Rules of Evidence called
for the substantive use of this evidence. FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee note. Al-
though legislative compromise limited this provision to prior inconsistent assertions made
under oath, some commentators continue to argue that all prior inconsistent assertions should
be admissible as substantive evidence. See, e.g., Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for
Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amenmdments of Federal Rules
ofEvidence 801(d) (1) (A), 613, and 607, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1565 (1977).
109 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
110 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
11 1 Even if the authorities would be encouraged to postpone the reading of Miranda warn-
ings by the decision in Fletcher, the Court has indicated that this concern is not controlling. In
Harris. the Court emphasized that "[tihe impeachment process. . . undoubtedly provide[s]
valuable aid to the jury in assessing [a witness's] credibility, and the benefits of this process
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The Court's decision in Fletcher was undoubtedly influenced by the
procedural history of the case. Because Fletcher originated in a state
court, the Court was forced either to announce a per se rule under the
federal constitution or to defer to the Kentucky state court and affirm
the defendant's conviction.'t 2 The Court's decision to adopt the latter
approach shifts to the state courts the responsibility for determining
whether to permit the impeachment use of silence which follows arrest
but precedes the receipt of Miranda warnings. t t3 This determination
should be made on the basis of state evidentiary law' 14 and should in-
volve a weighing of the probative value of the prior silence against the
standard countervailing considerations."t 5 This procedure enables the
state courts to control the impeachment use of prior silence in accord-
ance with the circumstances of the particular case. Moreover, it pre-
serves the benefits of impeachment and adequately protects individual
rights.
As noted above, the impeachment use of prior silence contributes to
the ascertainment of the truth. 16 In many situations, the probative
value of prior silence is significant. For example, an arrestee's failure to
inform the authorities of circumstances which would establish his inno-
cence or bring about his immediate release is clearly unnatural and
should not be lost. . . because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct
will be encouraged thereby." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
112 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
113 This shifting of responsibility is consistent with the "new federalism" philosophy of the
Burger Court. See generallj, Symposium, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REx'. 599 (1981).
1t4 The states could also make this determination on the basis of state constitutional law.
The Burger Court's reluctance to expand individual rights has led many state courts to look
to their own constitutions as a source of additional procedural safeguards. See Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. R Ev. 489 (1977); Howard, supra
note 77. This approach is particularly effective because the federal courts cannot review state
court decisions based on state constitutional law. Seegeneral J. NOWAK, Sbpra note 4, at ch. 1.
Although reliance on state constitutional provisions is not uncommon, this procedure
seems inappropriate as a means of restricting the impeachment use of prior silence. The
Court did not mention state constitutional law in Fletcher, and the opinion suggests that the
impeachment use of prior silence is primarily an evidentiary problem. The state courts can
look to their own evidentiary law as a source of the greater protection which the Court re-
fused to extend under the federal constitution. This approach enables the state courts to
control the impeachment use of prior silence in accordance with the circumstances of the
particular case.
115 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. The evidentiary analysis should be made
outside the presence of the jury, and a decision to introduce the prior silence should be ac-
companied by a jury instruction which emphasizes that the evidence is being admitted for the
limited purpose of impeachment. But see supra note 108. Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides that "[hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be
conducted out of the hearing of the jury fand] [h]earings on other preliminary matters shall
be so conducted when the interests of justice require .... " FED. R. EVID. 104(c).
I t6 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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should be admissible in the event that he asserts the exculpatory circum-
stances at trial. Even when the advantages of speaking to the authorities
are less obvious, disclosure of a defendant's prior silence may contribute
to the development of relevant facts. The application of state eviden-
tiary law is responsive to the need for impeachment in these situations.
In addition to preserving the benefits of impeachment, the applica-
tion of state evidentiary law adequately protects individual rights. First,
the impeachment process requires an initial finding of inconsistency be-
tween a witness's testimony and his prior silence. 1 7 This requirement
protects the defendant whose prior silence was natural under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. Second, the traditional evidentiary
standards of admissibility require that relevant evidence be excluded if
its probative value is outweighed by the risks which would accompany
its admission."t 8 This principle enables the state courts to prohibit the
impeachment use of prior silence even though the silence was unnatural
if this is necessary to protect individual rights. Finally, the defendant
has an opportunity to explain his prior silence if the silence is used to
impeach his testimony." '9 In Hale, the majority suggested that this pro-
cedure would be unlikely to overcome "the strong negative inference
that the jury is likely to draw" from the defendant's failure to speak.' 0
The Court provided no empirical data to support this general proposi-
.tion, however, and the position does not seem to be validated by experi-
ence. A defendant who was aware of his right to remain silent and was
induced to exercise that right by his arrest can testify as to the source of
his knowledge and the reasons for his conduct.' 2 1 Explanations of prior
silence are no different from any other facts about which a witness may
117 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
119 A witness who has been impeached on cross-examination must be afforded an opportu-
nity to explain his prior assertions and thereby rehabilitate his credibility. 4 J. WIu;MORE,
supra note 1, §§ 1100-1144. Rule 613 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
"[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent [assertion] by a witness is not admissible unless the
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is
afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise re-
quire." FED. R. EvID. 613(b).
120 422 U.S. at 180. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
121 The defendant can also explain his prior silence if he was induced to remain silent by
any of the other factors discussed in Hale. See supra note 37. In his dissenting opinion in Dqyle,
Justice Stevens argued not only that a defendant's opportunity to explain his prior silence is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the fourteenth amendment, but also that the impeach-
ment use of post-arrest silence imposes a greater burden on due process if the defendant's
silence preceded his receipt of Miranda warnings. He reasoned that the defendant who has
been informed of his right to remain silent is better able to explain his silence as a direct
consequence of the warnings and is therefore in a better position to rehabilitate his testimony.
426 U.S. at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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testify. 22 The jury must consider the evidence and determine whether
the defendant is telling the truth.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impeachment use of prior silence raises important evidentiary
and constitutional questions. The practice contributes to the ascertain-
ment of the truth at trial by forcing a witness to explain his prior incon-
sistent assertions and by discouraging the presentation of fabricated
defenses. At the same time, however, permitting prior silence to be used
for impeachment purposes burdens the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination where there has been custodial in-
terrogation and threatens the right to due process guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. An examination of the impeachment use of si-
lence which follows arrest but precedes the receipt of Miranda warnings
must therefore balance the benefits of impeachment against the concern
for the protection of individual rights.
The Supreme Court opinion in Fletcher v. Weir contains an unper-
suasive recitation of legal precedent rather than a thoughtful discussion
of the balancing test outlined above. Nevertheless, the opinion's conclu-
sion that the impeachment use of silence which follows arrest but pre-
cedes the receipt of Miranda warnings is constitutionally permissible is
neither surprising nor inexpedient. The Court's refusal to announce a
per se rule under the federal constitution and its failure to recognize the
need for constitutional protection in the event of an express invocation
of the right to remain silent are consistent with the Court's retreat from
the protection of individual rights afforded in Doyle. At the same time,
however, an examination of the facts which distinguish Fletcher from
Doyle suggests that constitutional protection is not justified in the former
case. The Court's decision to defer to state evidentiary law recognizes
that, unless an arrestee has received Miranda warnings or has expressly
invoked his right to remain silent, the probative value of prior silence
outweighs the possibility that governmental action has induced the ar-
restee's failure to speak. A constitutional prohibition of the impeach-
ment use of all post-arrest silence is therefore unwarranted. The Court's
approach relies on the safeguards provided under traditional eviden-
tiary law and allows the state courts to control the impeachment use of
silence which follows arrest but precedes the receipt of Miranda warnings
in accordance with the circumstances of the particular case.
Although the Court's decision in Fletcher v. Weir strikes a reasonable
balance between the need for impeachment as a means of ascertaining
the truth at trial and the concern for the protection of individual rights,
122 See 658 F.2d at 1136 (Engel, J., dissenting).
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it is of limited practical importance. In order to avoid the judicial ex-
clusion of evidence, most law enforcement agencies strictly adhere to the
dictates of Miranda and an individual is seldom subjected to custodial
interrogation without having been informed of his right to remain silent.
In the unlikely event that the authorities fail to administer Miranda
warnings, the decision in Fletcher is limited to those situations in which
the arrestee fails to speak and his silence is subsequently used to impeach
his testimony at trial. Nevertheless, Fletcher is a significant case. It re-
flects the Burger Court's continued unwillingness to increase the protec-
tion of individual rights and its emerging committment to the "new
federalism" philosophy in the administration of justice.
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